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Judging the Judges: Judicial
Independence and Reforms to the
Supreme Court of Canada
Appointment Process
*

The Honourable Michael J. Bryant**
The most important constitutional issue facing Canadians today is
the role of the judiciary in the state. The appointment of judges, their
security of tenure, their administrative independence and other facets of
institutional independence are all aspects of what is becoming the dominant constitutional issue of our time.
Twenty years ago we talked about what the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms would do. Ten years ago, we talked about where the remarkable Charter jurisprudence would go and how far it would go. Today,
more and more the public debate focuses on the judges themselves.
Nothing could have a greater effect on constitutional law than changes
to the independence of the judiciary. It is in this context that I offer my
perspective on possible reform of the appointment process for judges of
the Supreme Court of Canada, and how such reform could in turn affect
how other federal and provincial court appointments are made.

I. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
The Supreme Court itself has very well articulated what judicial independence is and why it is so important. In The Provincial Judges
Reference,1 the Supreme Court recognized that the “constitutional
*

This article is based on the keynote address delivered by the author at the 2003 Constitutional Cases Conference on April 2, 2004 in Toronto, Ontario.
**
Attorney General of Ontario, Minister Responsible for Native Affairs and Minister
Responsible for Democratic Renewal.
1
Manitoba Provincial Judges Assn. v. Manitoba (Minister of Justice), [1997] 3 S.C.R.
3, [1997] S.C.J. No. 75.
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home” for judicial independence was not only the Charter or the Constitution Act, 1867, but also the unwritten and organizing principles of the
Constitution tracing as far back as the Act of Settlement, 1701. The
Court noted that there were two goals inherent in judicial independence:
•

the maintenance of public confidence in the impartiality of the
judiciary; and
the maintenance of the rule of law.2

•

To further these goals, the Court held that there were limits to legislative
sovereignty over judicial institutions.3 That is, the judiciary is independent from the other branches of government.
Earlier, the Court had recognized two dimensions of judicial independence: the individual independence of judges and the collective
independence of the courts as an institution.4 Institutional independence
arises from the position of the courts as “organs and protectors of the
Constitution and the fundamental values embodied in it — rule of law,
fundamental justice, equality, preservation of the democratic proc-

2

Id., at para. 10.
Id., at para. 108:
It follows that the same constitutional imperative – the preservation of the basic
structure – which led Beetz J. (In OPSEU v. Ontario (Attorney General), [1987]
S.C.J. No. 48, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 2) to limit the power of legislatures to affect the
operation of political institutions, also extends protection to the judicial institutions of our constitutional system.
See also the comments of Justice Le Dain in R. v. Valente, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 673, at 685,
[1985] S.C.J. No. 77:
Without that confidence the system cannot command the respect and acceptance
that are essential to its effective operation. It is, therefore, important that a tribunal should be perceived as independent, as well as impartial, and that the test for
independence should include that perception.
4
As stated in R. v. Valente, id., at 687:
The relationship between these two aspects of judicial independence is that an individual judge may enjoy the essential conditions of judicial independence but if
the court or tribunal over which he or she presides is not independent of the other
branches of government, in what is essential to its function, he or she cannot be
said to be an independent tribunal.
3
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ess…”.5 It is institutional independence that enables the judiciary to
fulfil its role as protector of the Constitution.
In considering changes to the appointment process, I believe we
must proceed with caution. What is at stake is the relationship between
the branches of government that form the basic structure of our society.

II. TWO DEBATES UNDERWAY
Two very different debates are taking place over judicial independence. The first one is being conducted by what I call “legal populists”
and their theme is so-called judicial accountability. While serving as an
MPP in the Official Opposition, I opposed various attempts by members
of the legislature to limit or “rein in” the judiciary, such as a proposed
measure to keep track of sentences made by judges by way of report
cards.6
Those legal populists calling for judicial accountability typically
criticize the courts for treading where legislators bridle. There is an
insidious logic to this legal populism. The courts are the people’s courts,
the argument goes, and therefore the people deserve to have justice
dispensed in a fashion somehow consistent with public opinion. I believe that this reaction is nothing less than partisan “sour grapes” masquerading as an institutional critique. I do not believe that such criticism
is truly about the institution and how the judges are appointed. I believe
the concern is about the jurisprudence being rendered and the results of
cases. That is what is driving legal populism.
On the other hand, a very different debate is underway that has little
or no direct connection with this legal populism. Its focus is on how an
independent judiciary engages with the executive branch of the state. In
some ways this debate may serve to fend off the legal populists — by
building public confidence around the independence of the judiciary so
as to, in my view, expose the legal populist critique. Here are some of
the questions being raised by this other voice in questioning how judges
are appointed.
5
Manitoba Provincial Judges Assn. v. Manitoba, supra, note 1, at para. 123, citing a
passage from the Court’s decision in Beauregard v. Canada, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 56, [1986]
S.C.J. No. 50.
6
Ontario Hansard, April 26, 2001.

32

Supreme Court Law Review

(2004), 24 S.C.L.R. (2d)

First, how does the constitutional guarantee of administrative independence — within the context of the institutional independence of the
judiciary — square with the reality that judges are a critical player in the
administration of justice? The bar, the bench and government are all
players in the justice system. Government is accountable to the legislature and the people. The bar does not have constitutional independence.
The bench does.
Here is one illustration. The courts in Brampton, Ontario have the
highest caseload in the country and, from time to time, backlogs arise
there that need attention. Recently, Brian Lennox C.J. of the Ontario
Court of Justice and I have agreed to send in more mobile courts, more
judges, more Crown attorneys and more court workers than ever before.
I will be held accountable in the House and otherwise to the people for
how successful or unsuccessful this effort is. But I cannot mandate the
Chief Justice to send these people into that court.
The issue is: How is the judiciary going to be accountable for the
administration of justice, while at the same time preserving the administrative independence that has been guaranteed by our Constitution as
articulated in the Valente decision7 and again, most recently in The
Provincial Judges Reference?8
How can judicial appointments attract the measure of independence
befitting the rightly unaccountable branch of the state, while ensuring
that the executive that appoints the judges is accountable to the legislature and to the people? The editorial boards of various major newspapers have been pressing lawmakers to look at this issue for some time.9
The recommendations range from greater transparency, so that there is a
greater understanding of how the system works, to arguments that border on the legal populist approach.

III. DEMOCRATIC REFORM ON THE AGENDA
It was in the context of the need to build public confidence in the
appointments system that the Prime Minister announced in December
7

R. v. Valente, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 673, [1985] S.C.J. No. 77 [hereinafter “Valente”].
Manitoba Provincial Judges Assn. v. Manitoba, supra, note 1.
9
“Judicial Reform Overdue: Once again, let’s consider confirmation hearings for
judges”, National Post (4 November 1999), A18.
8
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2003 that the federal government would “specifically consult the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights on how best to implement
prior review of appointments of Supreme Court of Canada judges”.10 In
February 2004, this commitment was repeated in the Action Plan for
Democratic Reform released by the Martin government.11 I can certainly
understand the impulse for democratic reform. It is present at the provincial level as well.12
In addition to my role as Attorney General, I serve as Ontario’s first
Minister Responsible for Democratic Renewal. Our government has
established a Democratic Renewal Secretariat to work toward meaningful improvements in the political system. It is our intention to consult
extensively on possible innovations in voting, new spending limits for
political parties and innovative ways to engage youth in the democratic
process.
I have been giving a lot of thought to the issue of Supreme Court
appointments lately. As both Attorney General with constitutional responsibility for the administration of justice in the province, and Minister Responsible for Democratic Renewal, I may be uniquely positioned
to look at all sides of the issue.
This question assumed an added urgency in the Spring of 2004 with
two Ontario vacancies to the Supreme Court due to the retirements of
Justices Iacobucci and Arbour.

IV. STANDING COMMITTEE HEARINGS
The Honourable Irwin Cotler, the federal Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, spoke to the Commons Standing Committee
on Justice and Human Rights on March 30, 2004. He said that he would
move forward with making recommendations to the Prime Minister for
filling the two upcoming vacancies in a way that is “as comprehensive
as possible in terms of the range of people who are consulted, and as

10

News Release, available online at <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news.asp?id=1>.
<http://www.democraticreform.gc.ca/actionplan/actionplan_e.htm>.
12
In Ontario see <http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/drs/>. For British
Columbia, see <http://www.citizensassembly.bc.ca/public>. For New Brunswick, visit
<http://www.gnb.ca/cnb/promos/Leg-Dem/index-e.asp> and for Quebec visit <http://www.
mce.gouv.qc.ca/srid/reforme_bref_en.htm>.
11
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uniformly systematic as possible in terms of the criteria by which candidates are identified”.13
Mr. Cotler pledged to come back to the committee after those appointments are made and explain in detail both the process followed,
and the details of the evaluation that resulted in the nominees. I think
this is a thoughtful and prudent way to proceed in the short term, and
will allow for a thoughtful and prudent approach to making long-term
changes to the appointment process.
The federal minister also discussed exactly how the nomination
process works and exactly what protocol has been followed by the federal Justice Minister. I think this may have been the first time that a
Parliamentary committee has heard exactly how this works. I imagine
that some people were surprised at how comprehensive the process is
right now in terms of the people who are consulted. One of the alternatives the committee will consider is whether or not the formalization of
that process will fulfil the need to ensure confidence in the appointments
system — or whether further measures are necessary.
Mr. Cotler also highlighted a reality that underlies every judicial appointment — whether federal or provincial — and that is the constitutional framework, as he put it. He reminded everybody that in the
constitutional framework the authority to appoint rests with the executive branch of government. That is a constitutional given. That is our
starting point, he said, because that responsibility cannot be delegated.
He went on to say that obviously the process can be improved upon, but
whatever approach is chosen has to take into account the constitutional
framework.
As well, I was pleased to see that Mr. Cotler highlighted the need
for provincial input. He said it was important to consult with provincial
Chief Justices, provincial bar associations, provincial leaders of the bar
and other interested provincial bodies. He added that it will be necessary
for him to consult with the provincial Attorney General of the province
where the appointment is taking place, because it is the provincial Attorney General who has the requisite understanding and expertise to
assess prospective nominees from the region.

13

<http://www.law-lib.utoronto.ca/conferences/judiciary/readings/evidence7.doc>.
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Of course, the fact that these hearings have commenced is largely an
expression of the Prime Minister’s original pledge to ask the committee
to examine ways to implement prior Parliamentary review.
What form will this prior review take? The chair of the Commons
Justice Committee, MP Derek Lee, has said he senses a very clear consensus in the committee. There is little appetite for an open-style hearing. He added that the door seems to close whenever the option of an
American-style Senate hearing comes up. I agree with him and with this
consensus. I want to add my voice to those who support the view that
this is not the direction that we ought to pursue.

V. COMPARING U.S. AND CANADIAN APPROACHES
I am reminded of the experience of the late Justice Felix Frankfurter
of the Supreme Court of the United States. As a law professor before
joining the court, Frankfurter argued strenuously for public scrutiny of
Supreme Court appointments. He wrote:
It is because the Supreme Court wields the power that it wields, that
appointment to the Court is a matter of general public concern and not
merely a question for the profession. In good truth, the Supreme Court is
the Constitution. …In theory, judges wield the people’s power. Through
the effective exertion of public opinion, the people should determine to
whom that power is entrusted.14

This is the most articulate summation of legal populism that I have
found. It is the exception to the rule that this is purely partisan sour
grapes dressed up as an institutional critique.
When he penned those words, Frankfurter could hardly have imagined that he would be the first to discover what they would come to
mean in practice. He was nominated to the Supreme Court in 1939 and
was called before the Senate Judiciary Committee — then a precedentsetting event. This was the beginning of the Senate’s practice, so familiar today, of questioning Supreme Court nominees in person.
Frankfurter apparently attended his hearing reluctantly. Before he
was questioned, he read a prepared statement that amounted to a com14
F. Frankfurter, “The Appointment of a Justice”, in Felix Frankfurter on the Supreme
Court, P. Kurland (ed.) (1970), at 211, 216-17.
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plete conversion from what I have termed the legal populist position. He
said:
I should think it improper for a nominee no less than for a member of the
Court to express his personal views on controversial political issues
affecting the Court. My attitude and outlook on relevant matters have been
fully expressed over a period of years and are easily accessible. I should
think it not only bad taste but inconsistent with the duties of the office for
which I have been nominated for me to attempt to supplement my past
record by present declarations.15

At the hearing, Frankfurter was questioned about such matters as
possible links to the Communist Party, his friendship with an official of
the British Labour Party, and his membership on the national committee
of the American Civil Liberties Union.
Asked to recall the experience, he later said: “I thought that it would
be just a little room where we’d sit around. I found that this was Madison Square Garden.”16
There is a lesson here, as we contemplate reform of the Supreme
Court of Canada appointment process. We must take care that our good
intentions do not ultimately lead to the kind of spectacle you would find
at Madison Square Garden or the Air Canada Centre.
It may be instructive to contrast the Canadian process with the
American process in more depth. Here in Canada, under the Constitution Act, 1867, the federal Parliament has the authority to establish a
“general court of appeal for Canada”.17 Using this power, the federal
Parliament established the Supreme Court of Canada in 1875. The statute that creates and governs the court today is The Supreme Court Act.18
Supreme Court judges are appointed by the Governor in Council —
that is, the federal cabinet. Under the legislation, at least three justices

15

H. Phillips (ed.), Felix Frankfurter Reminisces (1960), at 284.
Id., at 284.
17
Section 101. Section 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867 provides that “the Governor
General”, that is the federal government, “shall appoint the judges of the superior, district and
county courts in each province”. Section 92(4) of the Constitution Act, 1867 confers on each
province the power to make laws in relation to “the establishment and tenure of provincial
offices and the appointment and payment of provincial officers”. Under this provision, the
province appoints and pays the judges of the inferior courts. In Ontario, this is the Ontario
Court of Justice.
18
R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26.
16
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must be from Quebec. Since 1949, a pattern of regional representation
has been more or less maintained by tradition: three justices from Quebec, three from Ontario, two from the western provinces and one from
the Atlantic provinces. Aside from that, the only other formal qualification is that a judge must be a member of one of the provincial bars and
have a minimum of 10 years experience. Section 5 of the Supreme
Court Act sets the bar at 10 years — section 6 mandates that at least
three judges be from Quebec.19
So in this country there are few legal provisions governing the appointment of Supreme Court judges. And there appear to be no constitutional conventions that have developed in this area either.
Under our system, there is no requirement to have appointments
ratified by the Senate, the House of Commons or a legislative committee. While confidential consultations are held with the organized bar and
bench, the appointments take place outside public scrutiny.
The American system is the polar opposite. It is conducted in full
public view, but that brings its own problems, as Frankfurter pointed
out.
Yale Law Professor Stephen Carter describes the American system
as the “confirmation mess”.20 The origins of this “mess” go back to the
framers of the U.S. Constitution. Their outlook was shaped by the decade preceding the Revolutionary War. As one account puts it, the British
had advanced “to the most eminent stations men without education and
of dissolute manners”.21
The framers of the U.S. Constitution were determined to avoid this
by putting limits on executive authority. The debates at the time centred
on whether to vest the power to appoint in the entire legislature, the
Senate alone, the President alone, or in the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate. The Convention of 1787 settled for the latter as a
compromise. Over the years the Senate has not hesitated to wield its

19

Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26, s. 6.
See Stephen L. Carter, The Confirmation Mess: Cleaning up the Federal Appointments Process (New York: Basic Books, 1994).
21
The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States (Oxford University Press, 1992), at 41.
20
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power. In all, it has refused to confirm some 30 out of 144 Supreme
Court nominees, although its zeal has diminished over time.22
Prior to 1929, Senate confirmation hearings were conducted in
closed session, except on two occasions. Since then, the nomination
sessions have been public unless closed by majority vote. And since
1939 nominees have been questioned in person.
It is widely accepted that the Senate has introduced political and
ideological, if not blatantly partisan, considerations into the confirmation process. This practice has existed since the first nominees put forward by George Washington. Perhaps the most spectacular example was
the 1987 rejection of Judge Robert H. Bork. It is still discussed whether
Bork was actually “borked” — that is, treated unfairly — but no doubt
the debate was an ideological one turning on his previous rulings and
views.23

V. RISKS OF POLITICIZING THE COURT
While the Canadian process has its faults, few would want to replace it with the U.S. approach — as the Commons committee appears
to have noted. The biggest problem in my view with importing the confirmation mess from the United States into Canada is that Americanstyle hearings — open to the public and broadcast on national TV —
necessarily create expectations and a mandate for the nominee. The
nominee articulates answers to all of the litmus test questions asked by
the senators. The nominee says here is my position on this and on that.
This creates a mandate for that nominee to be that particular kind of
judge. It does not promote a constitution that lives and breathes and
evolves through that judge. That judge is now a conservative judge, a
liberal judge, a this judge or a that judge.
This is not how it is done in Canada. Of course, governments of different political stripes have appointed judges. But a direct correlation
cannot be made between who appointed them and what kind of jurisprudence they ended up rendering at the end of the day.

22

Abraham, Justices, Presidents, and Senators (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc.
1999), at 28.
23
“Bork Wasn’t Borked”, Washington Post (21 May 2001).
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If the U.S. system were adopted here, the mandate and the expectations of nominees would come with it. This would strike at the impartiality of judges. Not only that, the judgment of appointees would be
handcuffed to some extent because they came to the bench with a certain mandate and there would be expectations for them to fulfil that
mandate — or at least there would be that perception. This is the problem with a more transparent system — if transparency focuses on the
judge as opposed to the process.
On the other hand, transparency of the process makes sense. Indeed,
as the Minister Responsible for Democratic Renewal in Ontario, I am
personally and politically committed to greater transparency in government.
From the public’s vantage point, there are two concerns about the
appointment process — one around partisanship and the other around
the quality of nominees. The public needs to know that the process is
fair, rigorous and exhaustive. A more transparent process could well
strengthen public confidence in the Court itself.
On increased transparency of the process, I say, absolutely. But I seriously question transparency as to the judges’ views because this creates expectations and threatens to politicize appointments. I worry about
what happens to our democracy if the judiciary is forced to become
politicians with robes on. If judges were in any way to duplicate elected
branches of the state, we all lose a check and a balance on government
and the legislature. That is not the case now, but we must prevent this
from happening.
In the case of Ell v. Alberta,24 the Supreme Court of Canada specifically commented that political interference in the appointment process is
undesirable. The Court said:
Unquestionably, the perception that appointment to judicial office is
political in nature undermines public confidence in the administration of
justice.

In the Provincial Judges Reference, the Court expressly held that
there is a constitutional imperative that — to the extent possible — the
relationship between the judiciary and the other branches of government

24

Ell v. Alberta, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 857, at para. 45, [2003] S.C.J. No. 35.
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should be “depoliticized”.25 The legislature and executive cannot, and
cannot appear to, exert pressure on the judiciary.
The institutional independence of the judiciary reflects a deep commitment to the separation of powers between the judiciary and the other
branches of government. Any reform of the appointment process will
have to meet the constitutional test of judicial independence.
Let me add that this does not mean that the door to reform is constitutionally closed. In the same case of Ell v. Alberta,26 the Supreme Court
also signalled a more deferential approach to possible reform. Alberta
had brought in new legislation intended to improve the qualifications
and independence of Alberta’s justices of the peace. Justices of the
peace who did not meet these criteria were removed from office and
offered administrative positions. The constitutionality of these provisions was challenged as infringing the constitutional guarantee of judicial independence.
The Court found otherwise, ruling that “a removal from office that
is reasonably intended to further the interests that underlie the principle
of judicial independence is not arbitrary.”27 The Court believed that
judicial independence should not be interpreted in such a fashion as to
hinder necessary reforms to improve public confidence.
I know it is risky to predict what the Court might decide. But I
would venture to say that this balanced approach will prevail in the
Supreme Court of Canada if a reform of its own appointment process is
ever challenged on constitutional grounds.

VI. THE QUALITY AND CHARACTER OF THE COURT
Another concern with importing the U.S. system into Canada is that
it might turn away outstanding candidates. Here I am thinking about
L’Heureux-Dubé J., the second woman to be appointed to the Supreme
Court of Canada.
Justice L’Heureux-Dubé testified before the House of Commons
Standing Committee on Justice, Human Rights, Public Safety and
25
Manitoba Provincial Judges Assn. v. Manitoba, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3, at para. 131,
[1997] S.C.J. No. 75.
26
Ell v. Alberta, supra, note 24, at para. 46.
27
Id., at para. 33.
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Emergency Preparedness on March 30, 2004.28 Her testimony was important and insightful because she was the only judge who appeared
before that Committee. In her testimony before the Committee,
L’Heureux-Dubé J. indicated that she might have declined the nomination to the Supreme Court if she had been asked to appear before a parliamentary committee.
I believe that a wide open process would change the character of the
Court. An American-style system would attract applicants who are comfortable going before public hearings and answering questions. These
tend to be more the extroverted types who like to talk at length and lay
out their beliefs. If nominees had to appear before a committee, I do not
believe this requirement would necessarily turn aside every single excellent candidate. But, thinking about the Court’s membership today and
over the last 20 years, it is clear certain judges would never have participated in this. American-style hearings would change the character of
the Court and I feel that is just as important as deterring qualified applicants.

VII. ALTERNATIVE APPOINTMENT MODELS
So, if not U.S.-style open hearings, then what?
One alternative is the creation of an independent non-political
commission that vets potential nominees and makes recommendations.
This approach would resemble the way justices have been appointed to
the Ontario Court of Justice since the Honourable Ian Scott set up the
process in the late 1980s.29 This is the process, by the way, that a British

28

<http://www.parl.gc.ca/InfoCom/PubDocument.asp?DocumentID=1281895&Language=E>.
Ontario’s system for appointments to the Ontario Court of Justice goes back to December 15, 1988, when the then Attorney General, the Honourable Ian Scott, announced in
the Ontario Legislature the establishment of the Judicial Appointments Advisory Committee
as a pilot project, and set out its mandate: first, to develop and recommend comprehensive,
sound and useful criteria for selection of appointments to the judiciary, ensuring that the best
candidates are considered; and second, to interview applicants selected by it or referred to it
by the Attorney General and make recommendations.
On February 28, 1995, the Courts of Justice Act established the committee by legislation. All appointments to the Ontario Court of Justice must be made by the Attorney General
from amongst a list of applicants recommended to him by the committee, and chosen in
accordance with its own process of criteria, policies and procedures. These criteria, policies
and procedures are publicly available.
29
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consultation paper said is “generally cited as a model example”30 of
independent judicial appointments. The Government of Canada also has
a series of advisory committees for appointments to federal and provincial superior courts.31
Looking abroad, South Africa has an advisory body. There, the
President appoints judges from a list of nominees prepared by a Judicial
Service Commission. The commission must provide a list with three
names more than the number of appointments to be made. The President
may make appointments from the list, and must advise commission,
with reasons, if any of the nominees are unacceptable and any appointment remains to be made.
The commission is chaired by the Chief Justice and composed of
three judges, the Minister of Justice, four lawyers, one law professor,
four provincial representatives, four presidential nominees, six Members
of Parliament — at least three of whom are opposition members — and
in some cases other judicial and provincial representatives.
On the other hand, instead of giving advice, an independent commission could make selections that are mandatory. This is how Israel
does it — although in Canada we would have to work within the constitutional framework whereby it is the executive branch making the appointment.
Israel’s Judicial Selection Committee is composed of the Minister of
Justice as chair, another cabinet minister, two Members of Parliament,
the Chief Justice and two other justices of the Supreme Court and two
representatives from the bar. Politicians are in the minority in this system.

30
Department for Constitutional Affairs Consultation Paper, Constitutional reform: a
new way of appointing judges, July 2003.
Britain has announced that it would abolish the office of the Lord Chancellor, who has
appointed British judges. One of the options being considered is a judicial-services commission, a panel of knowledgeable individuals who would make a recommendation of qualified
applicants on a short list from which the government would choose.
31
The federal judicial appointments process has been in place since 1988. It is administered by the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs and applies to appointments to the
federal and provincial superior courts. The applicants are reviewed by an advisory committee
comprised of seven individuals from the bench, bar, and general public. If candidates are
ranked recommended or highly recommended, they are included in a bank of approved
candidates from which the Minister of Justice can make a recommendation for appointment.
This practice has not been applied to Supreme Court of Canada appointments.
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In March 2004, the Canadian Bar Association came forward with a
proposal for the Government of Canada to consider. The bar association
suggests creating a Special Advisory Committee to make recommendations to the government for each Supreme Court vacancy. These committees would include bench and bar representation, as you might
expect. What’s new is that each committee would also include four
Members of Parliament from the Standing Committee on Justice and
Human Rights.32
I have one comment on the involvement of elected representatives
in the selection process. Putting Members of Parliament on an advisory
committee again creates expectations. Members of Parliament are
elected with a political mandate. This is their job and they are rightly
accountable to the people. They will be under enormous pressure to
perform and report back to their constituents on what happened in the
committee, assuming of course that it was open to the public in some
fashion.
The only way I can see this working without politicizing the process
would be to maintain confidentiality as the Ontario process does —
although again, Members of the provincial Parliament are not involved.
I am thinking of an approach that resembles cabinet confidentiality.
MPPs or MPs who are in cabinet are elected with a political mandate
and they go into cabinet and make arguments and know that information
will remain in the cabinet room. There are rare, but unfortunate, cabinet
leaks and this fact should make us pause before we rush into a decision
about having MPs sit on such advisory committees.
Here is a further point to think about. The present system has led to
some surprising nominations that, with the passage of time, have been
heralded as courageous or inspirational. It could be argued that the more
people involved in the process, the safer appointments are likely to be.
A review process could become a barrier to bold or creative appointments, and make it more likely that appointments will be the product of
brokering.

32

2004.

Canadian Bar Association, Supreme Court of Canada Appointment Process, March
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VIII. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, Parliament is absolutely right to deliberate on this
matter in the way that it has been. Nothing could be more important than
getting democratic reform right. I also commend and very much support
the constitutional framework and the description thereof provided by
Mr. Cotler that will help guide the deliberations.
The House of Commons Committee has not heeded the clamour of
the legal populists. Yet I would encourage those with a scholarly interest
in the subject not to dismiss legal populism as trivial. The bench and the
bar take the independence of the judiciary for granted. But this view is
not necessarily shared and the virtue of it is not necessarily understood
by everybody. It is the job of elected officials to explain it. It is also the
job of those who are able to speak to the public — and who are accountable to the public — to defend judicial independence.
Whatever the path chosen, reform of the Supreme Court appointment process must respect the fundamental principle of judicial independence. Reform must foster the objectivity, the creativity and the
integrity that have characterized the past and present Supreme Court of
Canada. In other words, it must attract and allow for the appointment of
the best of the best, the most excellent of the excellent.
Nearly two centuries ago, Lord Brougham said that it was the boast
of Augustus that he found Rome of brick and left it of marble. I believe
that we have inherited and we have now a judicial system — an administration of justice — made of marble. Our challenge is to ensure we
leave it of gold.

